Abstract
Introduction
A firewall is often placed at each entry point of private network in the Internet. The function of this firewall is to provide secure access to and from the private network. In particular, any packet that attempts to enter or leave the private at some entry point is first examined by the firewall located at that point, and depending on the different fields of the packet, the firewall decides either to accept the packet and allow it to proceed in its way, or to discard the packet.
To perform its function, a firewall consists of a sequence of rules; each rule is of the form predicate → decision where the predicate is a boolean expression over the different fields of a packet, and the decision is either "a" (for accept) or "d" (for discard). To reach a decision concerning a packet, the rules in the sequence are examined one by one until the first rule, whose predicate is satisfied by the packet fields, is found. The decision of this rule is applied to the packet.
Designing the sequence of rules for a firewall is not any easy task. In fact, the sequence of rules for any firewall needs to be consistent, complete, and compact as we illustrated by the next (admittedly simple) example.
Example: Figure 1 shows a private network that contains a mail server s and a host h. The private network is connected to the firewall via interface 1, whereas the rest of the Internet is connected to the firewall via interface 0. The rest of the Internet has a malicious host m. We refer to these five rules as r 0 through r 4 , respectively. Rule r 0 accepts each incoming SMTP packet whose ultimate destination is a mail server s. Rule r 1 discards each incoming non-SMTP packet whose ultimate destination is s. Rule r 2 discards each incoming packet whose original source is a malicious host m. Rule r 3 accepts each outgoing packet whose original source is a host h. Rule r 4 accepts each outgoing packet. Next, we argue that this sequence of five rules suffers from three types of errors: consistency errors, completeness errors, and compactness errors.
The two rules r 0 and r 2 are conflicting because there are packets whose fields satisfy the predicates of both r 0 and r 2 (for example, a packet where I = 0, S = m, D = s, P = tcp, and T = 25 satisfies the predicates of both r 0 and r 2 ) and these two rules have different decisions. Therefore, the relative order of these two rules with respect to one another in the sequence of rules becomes very critical. For example, by placing rule r 2 behind rule r 0 in the above rule sequence, the firewall accepts all incoming SMTP packets even those that originated at the malicious host m. This relative order of rules r 0 and r 2 is likely a consistency error. This error can be corrected by placing rule r 2 at the beginning of the sequence of rules ahead of rule r 1 . This correction will cause the firewall to discard all incoming packets, including SMTP packets, that originated at the malicious host m.
The second error in the above rule sequence is that any packet where I = 0, S = m, and D = s does not satisfy the predicate of any of the five rules r 0 through r 5 . We refer to such an error as a completeness error. This error can be corrected by adding the following new rule immediately before rule r 3
The third error in the above rule sequence is that rule r 3 is redundant; i.e., this rule can be removed without affecting the set of all packets accepted by the rule sequence and without affecting the set of all packets discarded by the rule sequence. We refer to such an error as a compactness error. This error can be corrected by removing rule r 3 from the above rule sequence.
After we preform these corrections, we end up with the following sequence of rules.
In this paper, we present a method for designing the sequence of rules of a firewall to be consistent, complete, and compact. According to this method, a firewall designer starts by specifying what we call a firewall decision diagram whose consistency and completeness can be checked systematically (by an algorithm). Then, the designer applies a sequence of five algorithm to this firewall decision diagram to generate a compact sequence of firewall rules while maintaining the consistency and completeness of the original diagram.
Related Work
Design errors in existing firewalls have been reported in [3] . Yet, most of the research in the area of firewalls and packet classifiers was not dedicated to the problem of how to design correct firewalls. Rather, most of the research in this area was dedicated to developing efficient data structures that can speed up the checking of firewall rules when a new packet reaches a firewall. Examples of such data structures are the trie data structures in [12] , area-based quadtrees [6] , fat inverted segment trees [8] . A good survey of these data structures is presented in [9] .
Another research direction in the area of firewall design has been dedicated to the development of high-level specification languages that can be used in specifying firewall rules. Examples of such languages are the simple model definition language in [3] , the Lisp-like language in [10] , the declarative predicate language in [4] , and the high level firewall language in [1] . However, none of these specification languages is able to simplify the task of ensuring consistency, completeness, and compactness of the firewalls being specified.
Perhaps the research direction that is closest to the spirit of the current papers is reported in [11] , [7] , [2] . This research direction is dedicated to detecting every pair of conflicting rules in a firewall. Each detected pair of conflicting rules is then presented to the firewall designer who decides whether the two rules need to be swapped or a new rule need to be added. However, these methods do not deal with the completeness and compactness errors of a firewall.
According to the firewall design method in the current paper, firewalls are first specified as firewall decision diagrams. These decision diagrams are similar, but not identical, to other types of decision diagrams such as the Binary Decision Diagrams in [5] and the Interval Decision Diagrams in [13] .
Firewall Decision Diagrams (FDDs)
A field F i is a variable whose value is taken from a predefined interval of nonnegative integers, called the domain of F i and denoted by D(F i ).
A packet over the fields
A firewall decision diagram f (or FDD f , for short) over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 is an acyclic and directed graph that satisfies the following five conditions:
1. f has exactly one node that has no incoming edges, called the root of f , and has two or more nodes that have no outgoing edges, called the terminal nodes of f .
2. Each nonterminal node v in f is labelled with a field, denoted by F (v), taken from the set of fields
Each terminal node v in f is labelled with a decision that is either accept (or "a" for short) or discard (or "d" for short).
3. A directed path from the root to a terminal node in f is called a decision path. No two nodes on a decision path in f have the same label.
Each edge e, that is outgoing of a node v in f , is labelled with an integer set I(e), where I(e) is a subset of the domain of field F (v).
5. Let v be any terminal node in f . The set E(v) of all outgoing edges of node v satisfies the following two conditions: (a) Consistency: For any distinct e i and e j in E(v),
where ∅ is the empty set and D(F (v)) is the domain of the field F (v). Figure 2 shows an FDD over two fields F 0 and F 1 . The domain of each field is the interval [0, 9]. Each edge in this FDD is labelled with a set of integers that is represented by one or more non-overlapping intervals (that cover the set of integers). For example, one outgoing edge of the root is labelled with the two intervals [0, 3] and [8, 9] that represent the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9}.
Let f be an FDD over the fields
where v 0 is the root node in f , v k is a terminal node in f , and each e i is a directed edge from node v i to node v i+1 in f .
Each decision path
can be represented as a rule of the form:
Figure 2. An FDD
where decision is the label of the terminal node v k in the decision path and each field F i satisfies one of the following two conditions:
1. No node in the decision path is labelled with field F i and S i is the domain of F i .
2. There is one node v j in the decision path that is labelled with field F i and S i is the label of edge e j in the decision path.
An FDD f over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 can be represented by a sequence of rules, each of them is of the form
such that the following two conditions hold. First, each rule in the sequence represents a distinct decision path in f . Second, each decision path in f is represented by a distinct rule in the sequence. Note that the order of the rules in the sequence is immaterial.
We refer to a sequence of rules that represents an FDD f as a firewall of f .
A packet (p 0 , · · · , p n−1 ) over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 is said to be accepted by an FDD f over the same fields iff a firewall of f has a rule
Similarly, a packet (p 0 , · · · , p n−1 ) over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 is said to be discarded by an FDD f over the same fields iff a firewall of f has a rule
Let Σ denote the set of all packets over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 , and let f be an FDD over the same fields. The accept set of f , denoted f.accept, is the subset of Σ that contains all the packets accepted by f . Similarly, the discard set of f , denoted f.discard , is the subset of Σ that contains all the packets discarded by f .
Theorem 1 (Theorem of FDDs) For any FDD f over the fields
where ∅ is the empty set and Σ is the set of all packets over the fields
Two FDDs f and f over the same fields are said to be equivalent iff they have identical accepts sets and identical discard sets, i.e., f.accept = f .accept, and f.discard= f .discard .
Reduction of FDDs
As discussed in the precious section, the number of rules in a firewall of an FDD f equals the number of decision paths in f . Thus, it is advantageous to reduce the number of decision paths in an FDD without changing its semantics, i.e., without changing its accept and discard sets. The procedure for reducing the number of decision paths in an FDD without changing its accept and discard sets is called a reduction of this FDD. This procedure is discussed in this section. But before we introduce the concept of a reduced FDD, we need to introduce the concept of isomorphic nodes in an FDD.
Two An FDD f is called reduced iff it satisfies the following three conditions:
1. f has no node with exactly one outgoing edge.
2. f has no two edges that are outgoing of one node and are incoming of another node.
3. f has no two distinct isomorphic nodes.
The reduction procedure of FDDs is presented next. Applying Algorithm 1 to the FDD in Figure 2 yields the reduced FDD in Figure 3 . Note that a firewall of the FDD in Figure 2 consists of six rules, whereas a firewall of the FDD in Figure 3 consists of three rules. 
Marking of FDDs
In section 8, we describe an algorithm for replacing each rule in the firewall of a reduced FDD f by a sequence of "simple" rules. The total number of the resulting simple rules in the firewall equals the "degree" of a "marked version" of f . Next, we define what we mean by a marked version of an FDD and its degree.
A marked version f of a reduced FDD f is the same as f except that exactly one outgoing edge of each nonterminal node in f is marked "ALL". We adopt the convention:
f.accept = f .accept, and f.discard= f .discard .
We sometimes refer to f as a marked FDD. Figure 4 shows two marked versions f and f of the reduced FDD in Figure 3 . In f , the edge labelled [4, 7] and the edge labelled 
The degree of a marked FDD f , denoted deg(f ), equals the degree of the root node of f .
For example, deg(f ) = 5 where f is the marked FDD in Figure 4 (a), and deg(f ) = 4 where f is the marked FDD in Figure 4(b) .
From the above examples, a reduced FDD may have many marked versions, and each marked version may have a different degree. As mentioned earlier, the number of simple rules in the firewall of a marked FDD equals the degree of the marked FDD. Thus, it is advantageous, when generating a marked version of a reduced firewall, to generate the marked version with the smallest possible degree. This is achieved by the following algorithm. 
If Algorithm 2 is applied to the reduced FDD in Figure  3 , we obtain the marked FDD in Figure 4 (b).
Firewall Generation
In this section, we present an algorithm, Algorithm 3, for generating a firewall of a marked FDD f , which is generated by Algorithm 2 in section 5. The generated firewall is a sequence of rules where each rule corresponds to a decision path in the marked FDD f . Algorithm 3 computes for each rule in the generated firewall a binary number, called rank of the rule, and two predicates, called exhibited and original predicates of the rule. The rule ranks are used to order the computed rules in the generated firewall. The exhibited and original predicates of the rules are used in the next section to make the generated firewall "compact".
A firewall r over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 is a sequence of rules r 0 , · · · , r m−1 where each rule is of the form
Each S i is either the mark ALL or a nonempty set of integers taken from the domain of field F i (which is an interval of consecutive nonnegative integers). The decision is either a (for accept) or d (for discard). The last rule, r m−1 , in firewall r is of the form:
where each S i is either the mark ALL or the entire domain of field F i .
A packet (p 0 , · · · , p n−1 ) over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 is said to match a rule r i in a firewall over the same fields iff rule r i is of the form
A packet over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 is said to be accepted by a firewall r over the same fields iff r has a rule r i that satisfies the following three conditions:
1. The packet matches r i .
2. The packet does not match any rule that precedes r i .
The decision of r i is a.
Similarly, a packet over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 is said to be discarded by a firewall r over the same fields iff r has a rule r i that satisfies the following three conditions:
The decision of r i is d.
Let r be a firewall over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 . The set of all packets accepted by r is denoted r.accept, and the set of all packets discarded by r is denoted r.discard . The next theorem follows from these definitions.
Theorem 2 (Theorem of
Algorithm 3: (Firewall Generation) input : a marked FDD f over the fields F 0 , · · · , F n−1 and assume that along each directed path in f , if a field F i appears before field F j then i < j. output: a firewall r over the same fields such that r.accept = f.accept, and r.accept = f.accept and for each rule r i in r, the algorithm computes a binary number of n bits, called the rank of r i , and two predicates, called the exhibited and original predicates of r i . steps:
1. For each decision path in f , compute a rule r i , its rank, its exhibited predicate ep i and its original predicate op i as follows:
where each b i , S i , and T i is computed according to the following three cases: Case 1:(The decision path has no nodes labelled
The decision path has a node labelled F i , and its outgoing edge e has no mark) b i = 0; S i =the integer set that labels e T i =the integer set that labels e Case 3:(The decision path has a node labelled F i , and its outgoing edge e has an ALL mark)
T i =the integer set that labels e 2. After computing all the rules and their ranks, order the rules in r in an ascending order of their ranks.
As an example, if Algorithm 3 is applied to the marked FDD in Figure 4(b) , we obtain the firewall in Figure 5 . Associated with each of the three rules in this firewall are a rank, and an exhibited and original predicates. In particular, associated with the first rules are [5, 7] ), original predicate =exhibited predicate.
Associated with the second rule are:
Associated with the third rule are:
Note that the three rules are placed in the firewall in ascending order of their ranks. 
Firewall Compactness
Firewalls that are generated by Algorithm 3 in the last section can have redundant rules, i.e., rules that can be removed from their firewalls without affecting the accept or discard sets of these firewalls. For example, the second rule in firewall r in Figure 5 is redundant. Thus, removing this rule from r yields the equivalent in Figure 6 . The two firewalls are equivalent since r .accept = r.accept, and r .accept = r.accept A firewall is called compact iff it has no redundant rules. It is straightforward to argue that the firewall in Figure 6 is compact.
In this section, we present an algorithm, Algorithm 4, for detecting and removing all redundant rules from the firewalls generated by Algorithm 3. Algorithm 4 is based on the following theorem. If we apply Algorithm 4 to the firewall in Figure 5 , we obtain the compact firewall in Figure 6. 
Firewall Simplification
A firewall rule of the form
is called simple iff every S i in the rule is either the ALL mark or an interval of consecutive nonnegative integers. A firewall is called simple off all its rules are simple.
The following algorithm can be used to simplify any firewall generated by Algorithm 3 or Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 5: (Firewall Simplification) input : a firewall r generated by Algorithm 3 or Algorithm 4 output: a simple firewall r such that r .accept = r.accept, and r .accept = r.accept steps: while r has a rule of the form
→ decision where S is a nonempty set of nonnegative integers that has neither a − 1 nor b + 1 do replace this rule by two consecutive rules of the form:
If we apply Algorithm 5 to the compact firewall r in Figure 6 , we obtain the simple firewall r in Figure 7 . Note 
Summary of Firewall Design
It is useful to summarize our firewall design method in this section, Figure 8 shows the different steps of our fire-wall design method.
A user specified FDD f Algorithm 1
A generated firewall r Algorithm 4
A compact firewall r Algorithm 5
A simple firewall r
Figure 8. Steps of our firewall design method
The method starts by some user specifying an FDD f . The consistency and completeness properties of f can be verified systematically, possibly using a computer program. Although f guarantees that the final firewall is both consistent and complete, f should not be used to directly generate and simplify this final firewall (otherwise, the number of simple rules in the final firewall would be very large). Instead, f is first reduced (using Algorithm 1), and some of its edges are marked with the ALL mark (using Algorithm 2), then the firewall is generated from the marked FDD (using Algorithm 3).
Note that although marking some of the edges in an FDD introduces conflicts into the FDD, the marking algorithm, Algorithm 3, maintains the consistency and completeness conditions of the original FDD.
Unfortunately, the generated firewall can still have some redundant rules (even though this firewall is generated after applying the reduction algorithm, Algorithm 1, go get rid of many redundant rules). Thus, Algorithm 4 is used to detect and remove all the remaining redundant rules from the generated firewall.
Finally, Algorithm 5 is used to simplify the rules in the generated firewall. Note that the marking algorithm, Algorithm 2, guarantees that the number of simple rules in the generated firewall is kept to a minimum.
Concluding Remarks
Our contribution in this paper is two-fold. First, we proposed to use firewall decision diagrams to specify firewalls at the early stage of firewall design. The main advantages of these diagrams is that their consistency and completeness can be checked systematically. Second, we developed a sequence of five algorithms that can be applied to a firewall decision diagram to generate a compact sequence of firewall rules while maintaining the consistency and completeness of the original firewall diagram.
In our firewall design method, we assume that to each encountered packet, a firewall assigns one of two decisions: accept or discard. Nevertheless, this design method can be easily extended to allow a firewall to select one of any number decisions. For example, the extended method can be used to design a firewall that assigns to each encountered packet a decision taken from the following four decisions: accept, accept-and-log, discard, and discard-and-log.
The design method discussed in this paper is not restricted to designing firewalls. Rather, this method can also be applied to the design of general packet classifiers.
